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Abstract 
 
 
We examine the most likely strategy of product differentiation by newly entering 
multinational firms when market reforms begin in a developing economy. We argue that 
incumbents in a non-contestable protected market do not have the usual advantages of an 
incumbent as in a standard sequential entry model of contestable markets. In this context we 
use a model of vertical product differentiation to argue that a new entrant will choose a 
higher quality product and a higher price given the income distribution profile brought in by 
the market reforms. We test the propositions empirically on the basis of firm level panel data 
for five Indian durable consumer goods industries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The industrial and trade policy reforms introduced in India since the mid-eighties caused entry 
of quite a few multinational corporations (MNC) with new technology and differentiated 
products into several Indian industries. Entry of MNCs into the markets of developing 
economies, that used to be non-contestable until recently, poses interesting questions on the 
issue of incumbency advantage (or disadvantage) of local firms and corresponding strategies 
of MNC firms. 
 
In the literature on sequential entry, the incumbent is taken to have an advantage over new 
entrants owing to a low cost position and to lower demand elasticity for its product relative to 
new entrants. Low cost advantage arises from possible learning economies in production 
internalized by the incumbent and lower demand elasticity arises from consumer inertia, 
switching costs in consumption, and advertising-induced brand allegiance. Incumbents’ 
advantage is further enhanced by their pre-emptive activities that constrain the entry decision 
and subsequent moves of later entrants.  For example in Schmalensee’s (1978) classic 
analysis of the breakfast cereals market, product diversification by incumbents leaves little 
room for later entrants. Likewise in Donnenfeld and Weber (1992) incumbents occupy 
strategic positions along the quality spectrum in anticipation of possible later entry by 
potential players. We should note that the markets analysed in this literature are not only 
contestable, but are taken to have been contestable always in the past. 
 
Though our paper is also concerned with sequential entry, its context differs in one important 
respect. Indian markets have become contestable only recently as a result of market reforms. 
Until the reforms, incumbents in these markets were protected by an industrial licensing 
regime that insulated them from contest (Bhagwati, and Desai, 1970). Incumbents in domestic 
industries thus worked without much concern for potential entrants. Their prices or product 
position in the quality space were not typical of incumbents who fear potential entry, but were 
more akin to monopolists or cartelised oligopolies (Patibandla, 1998). As a result, they had 
not made the usual entry deterrent investments, and later when licensing was abolished and 
markets made contestable they were at a disadvantage. Besides, the pre-reform import-
substituting package of the government of India had protected domestic producers from 
imports as well, generally leading to product quality below international standards. Thus even 
though the brands of the incumbent firms were widely sold and bought over the whole 
country, they had not generated significant brand loyalty that could be used against potential 
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entrants in the post-reform era. On the other hand given the large size of the Indian market, 
incumbents had significant sunk costs in production capacity that would act as an inertial 
force against quick changes in product quality or product innovation in the post-reform 
competitive phase. 
 
In this situation, potential new entrants are not as seriously handicapped as is the case in 
standard models of sequential entry. Also new entrants in our case are MNC’s who, in some 
other countries, have already developed and marketed the range of products that they are 
considering for the newly opened Indian market. This introduces an asymmetry to the 
advantage of potential entrants. For changing product specification or improving quality, an 
incumbent has to grapple with significant sunk costs in the existing product. On the other 
hand an MNC contemplating entry looks at the range of qualities in the product market as an 
ex ante choice without any sunk costs constraining this choice. 
 
The purpose of our paper is to use these specifications to explain some developments in the 
consumer durables market in India in the post-reform period. In section 2 we examine the 
choices regarding product differentiation available to a new entrant using a vertical product 
differentiation model, and isolate the most likely strategy they are expected to choose. This 
discussion is influenced by the insights developed by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1987), and 
further elaborated in Sutton (1989, 1992), namely that R & D and advertising can be thought 
of as sunk costs. However given the specific context of the Indian market, we try to utilise 
these insights in a somewhat different way. Normally these insights lead to models that seek 
to endogenise these expenditures as solutions to an oligopolistic game. But in a market that 
features incumbents who have been only recently exposed to contestability, the sunk costs of 
the former become exogenous to the subsequent game that ensues in the competitive phase. 
We analyse the potential entrants’ decisions on the assumption that they know that the 
incumbents are saddled with efficient future choice consequence of pre-existing investments 
(a historically given sunk cost). We should add however that we make no attempt to model 
the equilibrium of the industry under our set of specifications. Rather, we are interested in 
explaining recent developments in durable goods markets as the outcome of MNC’s extant 
choices, and there is no presumption that the present state represents an equilibrium structure. 
Thereafter, section 3 uses firm level panel data for five industries, namely motor cycles, 
refrigerators, television sets, washing machines and air-conditioners to test the implications of 
probable choice discussed in section 2. Finally section 4 concludes the discussion.  
 
 3  
2. A Stylised Presentation of the Indian Scene 
 
Consider the generic market for a durable consumer item. Suppose the hedonic attributes 
underlying each product in this market are summarized in a scalar measure q called quality. 
Such a measure is now commonly used following Mussa and Rosen, 1978, and the logic of 
comparing differentiated products by going back to more fundamental measurable attributes 
has been discussed in Rosen, 1974.  
 
Assume that potential consumers have identical preferences but are differentiated in terms of 
income, y.  They buy one unit of the product or none at all1. If one unit of the product of 
quality q is sold at price p, we will denote the consumer surplus of a buyer of income y as S = 
yq - p. The surplus function implies that consumers are vertically differentiated. Utility 
functions that permit such differentiation were introduced by Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979 
and issues related to vertical differentiation have been extensively discussed in Gabszewicz 
and Thisse, 1986.  
 
Assume that y is continuously distributed with a density function  f(y) over a range (y, Y). 
When quality q0   is offered on the market at price p0, all buyers for whom S =  yq0 – p0 ≥ 0, 
are expected to buy the product. Thus all potential buyers for whom  y ≥  p0/q0  are expected 
to make a purchase, unless there is another product offering higher S. 
 
We can describe the pre-reform scene as a single producer or cartel, referred to as the 
incumbent, selling a given product of quality q0 at price p0.  It faces a market size  
 
 
and is assumed to have adequate capacity to meet this demand. 
 
Assume that average cost of production is an increasing function of quality and is constant for 
each quality. The incumbent’s average cost, denoted c1(q) for producing one unit of each 
quality is shown by the curve C1 in figure 1. Average cost increases at q0 but is quite flat up 
to some qa >q0 , and thereafter becomes very steep. This is to take account of the fact that 
                                                 
1 It is quite natural to assume this for a durable goods market. For some discussion see Gabszewicz and Thisse, 
1979. 
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given its technology and plant capacity, the incumbent can make neighbourhood variations in 
the product quality without much additional cost. However beyond this limit qa, average cost 
for higher quality products increases steeply. The sale price p0 in the protected pre-reform 
stage is shown in the figure as higher than the incumbent’s average cost c0  for quality q0, 
implying positive economic profit.  
 
A potential newcomer’s average cost curve is shown in figure 1 as C2, and the function will 
be denoted by c2(q) . At the ex ante or capacity planning stage, the potential entrant’s average 
cost curve is the envelope of average cost curves corresponding to different qualities, and is 
thus flatter than the incumbent’s, except in a close neighborhood of q0.  Relative positions of 
C1 and C2 close to q0 reflect the advantage in selling costs, marketing and some internalised 
economies of scale achieved by the incumbent before the newcomer’s entry, which the 
newcomer cannot duplicate. 
 
A potential entrant’s decision concerns the most appropriate position or range on the quality 
axis for building production capacity. More specifically, what is the range where the best 
pricing strategy can provide the largest possible share of the generic product’s market? In this 
decision the potential firm has to take advantage of the short run inflexibility of the 
incumbent’s quality range (or identically, the steeply rising average cost beyond qa ).  
 
We can partition the quality axis into three segments, presenting qualitatively different 
possibilities:  q< q0 ; q0 ≤ q ≤ qa ; qa <q . Since quality q0 is below international standards for 
the generic product, the segment q< q0 is ruled out in the non-monopoly phase of the market 
because there is no more protection from imports. Also products below q0 cannot be exported, 
and thus reduce the marketing options for the newcomer in the future. In the next segment, q0 
≤ q ≤ qa , the incumbent has a short run cost advantage. The incumbent in this segment will 
prove to be a strong competitor. Thus the newcomer is left with the third segment, qa <q. A 
potential entrant has to build capacity in this range, if at all. 
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3. Pricing Considerations 
 
However in a vertically differentiated market, the firm’s share of it depends on the price used 
with quality q to partition the market. To assess the potential market size, therefore, the 
entrant has to explore the best (p,q) combination for qualities in the range qa <q. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Average Cost Curves for an Incumbent and a Newcomer 
 
When considering pricing, the newcomer should assume that if it enters the market, the 
incumbent would compete in the short run by reducing its product price from the monopoly 
level. The lowest price the incumbent can afford is c0 = c1(q0)  and that should be taken as the 
incumbent’s price in case there appear more sellers in the market. At price c0, the incumbent’s 
product has non-negative consumer surplus for all buyers with y  ≥ c0 /q0. Given this, two 
qualitatively different pricing options emerge for the newcomer, discussed as cases 1 and 2 
below.  
 
C1 C2 
p0 
q0 qa 
c0 
Price and 
Average 
Cost 
Quality  
qb 
(q0, p0)
L 
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Case 1:  p /q >c0 /q0 
 
In this situation the new product offered by the newcomer breaks even with buyers at y = p /q, 
which is higher than c0/q0. However consumer surplus from the incumbent’s product remains 
higher than that of the newcomer until a higher income level given by y ′ = (p-p0)/ (q – q0 ). 
Therefore the market will be partitioned at this latter point (see Figure 2, left panel.) The 
market share of the incumbent and the newcomer are given by respectively: 
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Effects of Alternative Price Strategies of the Newcomer 
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Figure 3 
Share of Markets for the Incumbent and the Newcomer in Case 1 
 
Case 2:  p/q < c0/q0 
 
In this case, for the newcomer’s product, S  ≥ 0 for all y  ≥ p/q.  But, p /q < c0 /q0.  Therefore 
all buyers with y value between  p /q and c0 /q0 who were outside the market for the product 
offered by the incumbent are now part of the market of the new entrant. Also, we can check 
that qy –p > q0y –c0  for all y > p/q (see right panel, Figure 2).  It means that the newcomer 
can replace the incumbent’s product completely. This latter obviously then is a better strategy 
than the one in case 1, unless the newcomer is interested only in a niche at the top end of the 
market. 
 
From Figure 1, we can see that given its ex ante cost function, the newcomer can afford to sell 
at the configuration  p/q < c0/q0 only for the range of qualities between qa and qb. Any point 
on the newcomer’s average cost curve between these points have an average cost to quality 
ratio less than that of the line L. The qualities beyond qb have an average cost that does not 
allow them to be sold at any price satisfying p/q < c0/q0 without making a loss. Thus while the 
newcomer positions its product away from the neighbourhood (qa) of the incumbent’s quality, 
presumably it does not go on very far along the quality axis.  
 
 
Entrant’s market 
Incumbent’s market
          Share of incumbent and new entrant’s markets in Case 1 
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4. The Income Distribution 
 
This discussion, however, remains incomplete without considering the density function f(y). It 
is easy to see, for example, that in case 1 above a newcomer can look forward to a fairly large 
market for a very high quality and high priced product, away from the incumbent’s product, if 
the area under f(y) is large between y ′ and Y.  Thus the shape of f(y) is an important element 
in the exercise. Rather than examining any general relation between pricing, quality choice 
and the distribution f(y), we will focus on the specific empirical situation in the Indian market.  
 
The part relevant for the consumer durables market in India comprises only relatively high-
income households (top 8 to 10 per cent of income earners). Over this range income 
distribution is relatively denser towards the lower end. The higher end featuring very high 
income has relatively lower density. Also households with very high income often buy their 
durables from outside the domestic market, reducing the effective density of this part further. 
Thus in the Indian market at this stage case 2 would represent a better strategy for MNCs with 
long run interest in market share rather than in niche marketing. There is a second reason why 
this configuration should be popular to new entrants. Over the last decade GDP in India has 
been growing rapidly at an annual average rate of 5.5 percent. Most of this income increase 
has swelled the size of the Indian middle class, which is located at the lower end of the 
consumer durables market (Natarajan,1998)2. This implies that over time f(y) has been 
increasing faster for lower values of y in our range. This trend is expected to continue in the 
medium run. 
 
potential market. An entrant who positions products at the relatively lower end of the durables 
market is expected to enjoy a faster growth rate for its demand as overall income increases. 
                                                 
2 This study  of National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER), which surveyed a sample size of 
300,000 households in India, shows that the number of households with an annual income exceeding Rs. 0.5 
million at 1995-6 prices increased from 0.2 million in 1993-94 to 0.35 million in 1995-6 with a 33.8 per cent 
growth. The number of households with an income of Rs. 1 million doubled while Rs. 5 million-a-year 
households increased by two and half times.  
 itsfor    limits income   two  theare  and     whered)d(   like,  integral   timesome  is 
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Particularly, in Case 2, the newcomer, if it has not already displaced the incumbent, will 
experience a higher income elasticity of demand over time than the incumbent. 
 
If new entrants actually behave as outlined above, then there are two empirically observable 
outcomes: 
 
(1) In the market for the same generic product new entrants will have a higher unit price 
realisation compared to incumbents, after controlling for other relevant variables. This 
follows from the fact that in the contestable phase, the incumbent’s price is expected to 
be c1 (q0) while the newcomer’s price p is at least c2(q). Since c2 (q) is an increasing 
function, and c2(q0) >c1(q0)  and q > q0 , price realised per unit by the newcomer is 
higher.  
 
(2) The income elasticity of demand with respect to an aggregate income measure like the 
GNP or per capita GNP for the newcomer’s product will be higher than that for the 
incumbent’s. This is of course trivially true if the newcomer completely replaces the 
incumbent by building capacity that caters to the whole market. In reality, the 
newcomer is expected to build capacity in steps, and the incumbent hangs on to the 
rest of the market. But since p/ q < c0 / q0 , the newcomer is selling its products to 
buyers with lower y compared to the incumbent. As GDP increases with time, number 
of customers in the newcomer’s segment increases faster because of the change in 
income distribution described earlier. Assuming that the newcomer follows up this 
demand by increasing production and capacity, it will enjoy a higher income elasticity 
of demand. 
 
However these conclusions are contingent on the extent of disadvantage of the incumbents. 
Among the industries studied below, the motorcycle industry is a very well established 
industry with incumbent firms with a large amount of sunk costs in product development. 
They also completely depend on indigenous supply of engines and other components, 
implying that for them the cost of changing product specification is large. The model 
described above is therefore expected to describe this industry well. At the other extreme is 
the colour television industry, where not only are the incumbents relatively young, but they 
also use imported picture tubes. Thus new entrants do not enjoy significant advantage over 
incumbents in this industry. In terms of figure 1, there may not be much difference between 
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the average cost curves of incumbents and new comers. The situations in other industries fall 
between these extremes.  
 
 
5. The Empirical Analysis 
 
The hypotheses have been empirically tested by three exercises: 
 
(1) Estimating log linear inverse demand functions for the five industries listed earlier to 
test if new entrant MNCs realise a higher unit price in the same generic market 
compared to incumbents.  
 
(2) Further, a Probit equation on the basis of firm level panel data for these industries is 
estimated to test if the likelihood  of a firm being a new entrant MNC is greater  if the 
price and advertising intensity are higher (Maddala, 1983). 
 
(3) Estimating log linear demand functions to test if the new entrants enjoy significantly 
higher income elasticity of demand. 
 
Quite expectedly, the motor cycle industry does well with the first two tests while colour 
television does not with either. Other industries present a mixed scene. In the case of the third 
test about income elasticity all industries weakly conform to the test, while refrigerators and 
air conditioners do well. 
 
 
6. Data 
 
The data is collected for five consumer durable industries for the time period of 1990 to 1996 
from the publications of the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) on the Indian 
corporate sector. These industries are Refrigerators (R), Color Televisions (CT), Washing 
Machines (W), Air-conditioners (A) and Motor Cycles (M). One reason for selecting these 
industries is that their products are produced almost entirely by large public limited 
companies, and production by informal sector assembly units is minimal. Since the CMIE 
data presents a complete coverage of the corporate sector the data for these industries virtually 
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represents the whole population. Table 1 provides information on the number of firms and 
new entrant MNCs in these industries.  
 
Table 1 
The Sample 
 
Industry Total Number of firms Number of New MNCs 
M 5 2 
R 5 1 
CT 7 1 
W 5 2 
A 4 1 
 
 
The panel data has several advantages as it utilizes information on both the inter-temporal 
dynamics and the individuality of the entities being investigated (Cheng, 1986). In order to 
control for firm-specific unobserved variables, eg various fixed effects, we have introduced 
dummy variables that separate firms in each industry sample.  
 
 
7. The Variables 
 
Given the data set, we have measured price (P) as (Sales turn-over/Quantity of sales).  This 
measure has an inherent weakness, which could result in a certain degree of noise in 
econometric estimations. Also it may not be able to capture the quality dimension accurately. 
As an example, consider the refrigerator industry that produces refrigerators of different sizes. 
Generally each firm produces all the sizes but vary the quality specification within each size 
segment. Ideally we should have classified each size as a separate generic product and derive 
an appropriate price measure. We do not have adequate data for this type of finer 
classification of generic products. Because of this limitation of the price variable, we have 
included, in one of the exercises, advertising intensity of firms (ADS = Total advertising 
expenditure/sales) to capture our arguments about product differentiation. The implicit 
presumption is that the higher the advertising intensity the higher is the product differentiation 
of a firm (Sutton, 1992). 
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P Unit price as defined above 
Q Quantity of sales 
Y Income (per capita net national product) 
D Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for new entrant MNCs and 0 for  
incumbents 
D1, 
D2 
D3, 
D4 
Firm specific dummies for capturing the fixed effects 
 
ADS Total advertising expenditure/sales 
 
 
8. The Results 
 
Table 2 presents the results for the estimated loglinear inverse demand functions. Except in 
the case of air-conditioners, the inverse demand functions are well identified with appropriate 
signs for the estimated coefficients of Q (negative sign) and Y (positive sign). Our first 
hypothesis can be verified by observing the sign of the estimated coefficient of the dummy 
variable (D) in the inverse demand function of Table 2. A positive coefficient implies new 
entrant MNCs realize a higher price for their product. The sign of the estimated coefficient of 
D is positive in the cases of M, W, and A and it is statistically significant only in the case of 
M.  In the case of R and CT, the sign is negative and it is statistically significant for R. Thus 
the hypothesis is not rejected for the motor cycle industry and clearly rejected for 
refrigerators. 
 
Table 2 
Estimated Log Linear Inverse Demand Function (log P) 
 
Industry Constant Log Q Log Y D D1 D2 D3 D4 Adjusted 
R2 
F N 
M -6.6 
(8.5)* 
-0.02 
(0.5) 
3 
(8.2)* 
0.03 
(1.78)** 
-0.02 
(0.8) 
-0.06 
(1.2) 
- - 0.77 27 32 
R -3.9 
(2.9)* 
-0.2 
(4.4)* 
1.92 
(3.2)8 
-0.47 
(6.9)* 
-0.16 
(4.2)* 
-0.11 
(2.4)* 
- - 0.73 14 25 
CT -2.3 
(1.3) 
-0.2 
(2.3) 
1.15 
(1.7) 
-0.03 
(0.4) 
0.2 
(2.5)* 
0.12 
(1.64) 
0.14 
(2.2)* 
-0.3 
(4.3)* 
0.60 12 52 
W -6.3 
(2)* 
-0.28 
(5.8)* 
2.91 
(2)* 
0.01 
(1) 
0.13 
(1.3) 
-0.14 
(1.6) 
- - 0.85 23 20 
A 3.45 
(2.4)* 
0.021 
(0.4) 
0.35 
(0.6) 
0.09 
(1.3) 
-0.07 
(0.9) 
0.01 
(1) 
- - 0.33 3.8 24 
Figures in the parantheses are t values. 
* significant at 0.01 and  ** significant at 0.05 levels 
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In view of the limitation of the price variable discussed earlier, the question is further probed 
by a Probit function, reported in Table 3. The dummy variable D is regressed against the price 
and advertising intensity variables. The Probit function tests whether the likelihood of a firm 
being a new entrant MNC is greater if the price and advertising intensity are higher (Maddala, 
1983). The results are not very different from those reported in Table 2. They show positive 
sign for the estimated coefficient of P in all cases except for the industry R.  But it is 
statistically significant only in the case of M. In the case of the advertising intensity variable, 
the estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant in three cases, R, W, and A, 
implying new entrant MNCs tend to have higher advertising intensity than incumbents. In the 
other two industries it is negative and statistically significant in the case of the colour 
television industry.  
 
Table 3 
Probit Estimates 
Dependent Variable (D) 
 
Industry Constant P ADS Log likelihood R2 
M -1.19 
(1.06) 
1.07 
(1.78)** 
-2.2 
(0.8) 
-20 0.09 
R 0.63 
(0.26) 
-3.8 
(1.07) 
8.5 
(2)* 
-7.3 0.38 
CT -0.78 
(0.7) 
1.8 
(1.4) 
-72 
(1.85)** 
-10 0.14 
W -2.6 
(1.79)** 
0.4 
(0.1 
26 
(2.0)* 
-3.9 0.75 
A -4 
(2.4)* 
369 
(0.5) 
3.2 
(2.8)* 
-5.7 0.6 
  Figures in the parantheses are t values. 
  *significant at 0.01 and ** significant at 0.05 levels. 
 
 
In order to test our second hypothesis that new entrant MNCs will have higher income 
elasticity for their products, we estimate a log linear demand function reported in Table 4. 
Besides log P and log Y, it features an interactive term D*log Y. Positive sign of the estimated 
coefficient of the interactive variable implies that new entrant MNCs realize higher income 
elasticity. From Table 4, its sign is positive in all cases and is statistically significant in the 
cases of refrigerators and air-conditioners. Also the value of income elasticity of demand is 
significantly greater than 1 in all cases. 
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Table 4 
Estimated Log-linear Demand Function (Log Q) 
 
Industry Constant Log P Log Y D D*log Y D1 D2 D3 D4 Adjusted
R2 
F 
M -11 
(4.3)* 
-0.66 
(1.98)* 
6.2 
(5.2)* 
-1.3 
(0.5
) 
0.36 
(0.4) 
-0.1 
(2.3)* 
0.4 
(9.6)* 
- - 0.87 37 
R -11 
(3.7)* 
-0.27 
(1) 
6.0 
(4.5)* 
-23 
(2.5
)* 
9.1 
(2.4)* 
-0.4 
(5.1)* 
-0.9 
(4.2) 
- - 0.91 43 
CT -5.4 
(2.9)* 
-0.66 
(3.7)* 
2.7 
(3.8)* 
-11 
(1) 
3.9 
(1.2) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
-0.3 
(3.3) 
0.08 
(0.7) 
-0.1 
(0.13) 
0.7 18 
W -24 
(2.7)* 
-2.2 
(4.6)* 
11 
(2.98)* 
-2 
(0.0
9) 
0.74 
(0.9) 
0.24 
(0.6) 
0.47 
(1.9) 
- - 0.85 20 
A -10 
(2.7)* 
0.3 
(0.46) 
6.1 
(3.6)* 
-9.3 
(1) 
4.6 
(1.78)** 
1 
(8.6) 
1.2 
(8)* 
- - 0.91 42 
Figures in the parantheses are t values. 
* significant at 0.01 and  ** significant at 0.05 levels 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have conjectured about a possible strategy of new entrant MNCs in a market 
recently made contestable. Obviously the scenario discussed is contingent on a critical amount 
of disadvantage of incumbents, which may or may not obtain in a given industry. Also the 
conjecture about income elasticity of demand is based on a very specific pattern of income 
growth characterising the Indian situation since reforms. Our empirical analysis shows some 
evidence that the scenario may actually prevail in some industries. 
 
We have already remarked in section 2 that the conclusions primarily hinge on the extent of 
incumbency disadvantage, partly captured by the difference in cost conditions faced by 
incumbents and new comers. Incumbency disadvantage would differ between industries not 
only because of the technical nature of products but also because of the history of a particular 
industry.  An old and established industry is likely to have incumbents with significant fixed 
costs tied to their customary product lines, while incumbents in a young industry may not 
have much disadvantage. Secondly the pre-entry level of indigenisation of an industry also 
accounts for the difference. A new comer may not have much cost advantage over an 
incumbent who uses mostly imported components. The colour television industry is a good 
example of this situation. In this industry the cost of changing product specification is not 
high for incumbents as they generally import the picture tubes and assemble them in-house 
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and also most incumbent firms are relatively new having started their production in the 80s. In 
these circumstances a new comer has to use some other strategy. For example in the very 
recent years, the South Korean MNC, Daewoo, entered the Indian market through intense 
price competition, so much so that it caused a general fall in colour television prices. On the 
other hand, the cost of changing product differentiation in the motor cycle industry is 
expected to be high given that incumbent firms have been operating for a considerably long 
period and use mostly indigenous components. In other words, the short run inflexibility of 
the incumbents’s quality range is more dominant in this industry. 
 
Though this discussion implies that we should expect to find mixed results across industries, 
the results of the present exercise may have been influenced by our choice of the price 
variable. A better alternative is to use a variable that can distinguish prices of different size 
classes of the same generic product. This would require more detailed data, but the effort may 
be worthwhile. 
 
Finally, apart from the specific model presented here, the paper tries to make a general point. 
Industrial behaviour in third world countries may often diverge from what is expected in the 
context of institutions characterising a developed market economy, and it may be useful to 
model and test behaviour with country-specific institutional assumptions. 
 
 16  
 
References 
 
Bhagwati Jagdish N. and Padma Desai, (1970) India: planning for industrialization: 
industrialization and trade policies since 1951, The MIT Press. 
 
Cheng, H. (1986) Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Donnefield, S. and Weber, S. (1992) Vertical Product Differentiation with Entry, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 10(3), 449-472. 
 
Gabszewicz, J..J. and Thisse, J.F. (1979) Price Competition, Quality and Income Disparities, 
Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 340-359. 
 
Gabszewicz, J..J. and Thisse, J.F. (1986) On the nature of competition with differentiated 
products, The Economic Journal, 160-72. 
 
Maddala, G.S. (1983) Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978) Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Economic 
Theory, 18, 301-317. 
 
Natarajan, (1998) India Market Demographic Report, National Council for Applied Economic 
Research, New Delhi. 
 
Patibandla, M. (1998) Structure, Organizational Behavior and Technical Efficiency, Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34(3), 419-34. 
 
Rosen, S. (1974) Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product Differentiation in pure 
competition, Journal of Political Economy. 
 
Schmalensee, R. (1978) Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, Bell 
Journal of Economics, 9(2), 305-327. 
 
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1982) Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation, 
Review of Economic Studies, 49, 3-13. 
 
Shaked, A and Sutton, J. (1987) Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure, Journal of 
Industrial economics, Vol 36, 131-146. 
 
Sutton, J, (1992) Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising and the 
Evolution of Concentration, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
 
Sutton, J. Endogenous Sunk Costs and Industrial Structure, in G. Bonanno and D. Brandolini 
(eds), Market Structure in the New Industrial Economics, Oxford; Oxford University 
Press. 
 
 
